Abstract. Neoclassical economists argue that competition promotes efficiency. They consider technology as given though. In the long run technological progress is an important determinant of the level of economic welfare and Schumpeter argued that monopoly rents help entrepreneurs to capture the gains of R&D and hence to invest in it. We investigate the overall effect of competition on performance. Performance is measured by TFP-growth. As a negative measure of competition we use rent. Rent is defined as the excess factor rewards over and above their perfectly competitive values (marginal productivities). In line with the literature we find that rent has no significant influence on productivity. Input-output analysis enables us to calculate rent for the Canadian sectors over a thirty-year period and to decompose it in its capital and labor components. Our main finding is that performance is positively associated with rents on capital but not with rents on labor. Neoclassical economists and Schumpeter may both be right, but the mechanisms differ. The use of rent as a source of funding for R&D applies to the capital market and the argument that rent yields slack pertains to the labor market.
Introduction
Is competition good for performance? Yes, say neoclassical economists, arguing that it eliminates slack and hence promotes static efficiency. No, say Schumpeter and others, pointing out that monopoly rents induce entrepreneurs to invest in R&D and thus promote dynamic efficiency. The mechanisms alluded to are quite different and the overall effect of competition becomes an empirical issue. Nickell (1996) finds some support for the view that competition improves performance, but the evidence is not overwhelming. Aghion et al. (2001 Aghion et al. ( , 2002 and Boone (2001) argue that the relationship between competition and innovation is non-monotonic. Griffith (2001) finds that product market competition improves performance in principal-agent type firms. We will review the argument in some detail and then pitch our approach.
If a market is more competitive, the stakes of sweeping it by winning an innovation contest are greater, as the scope is wider. On a product-by-product basis, however, margins are lower in a more competitive market. Aghion et al. (2001) combine the two countervailing effects in a single model, where industries are duopolies engaged in price (Bertrand) competition. 'Competition' is measured by the elasticity of substitution between the duopolists' products. A higher degree of substitutability boosts the reward to an innovation winner among leveled firms (the neoclassical effect), but reduces the (marginal) reward to non-leveled firms (the Schumpeterian effect). A level field will become less leveled and the new equilibrium is less congenial for innovation: followers face low rents to gain when demand is more elastic, while leaders do not distance themselves further as technological knowledge is assumed to spill over anyway after a single period. Industries become less leveled and the rent dissipation effect overtakes the contest effect. Competition and innovation have an inverted U relationship as a result. In a Hotelling-style example of three vendors Boone (2001) finds a U relationship and notes that "basically anything can happen," but Aghion et al. (2002) find empirical support for the inverted U relationship between competition and innovation.
Since Aghion et al. (2001 Aghion et al. ( , 2002 measure competition by means of the elasticity of substitution, both the neoclassical and the Schumpeterian effects are channelled through the product markets. This is also the market studied by Griffith (2001) , who suggests, however, that agency costs play a role in the scope for performance. We want to analyze the role of factor markets. Do neoclassical economists not argue that competition is good because it keeps managers sharp? And does Schumpeter not argue that monopoly profits are good because they fund R&D? Labor and capital may play conflicting roles in terms of the relationship between competition and performance. This conflict may explain why there is no simple relationship between the two.
Rather than relating rents to elasticities of demand in a neoclassical model of price competition, we decompose rents into factor components in a classical input-output framework and investigate if the opposing effects of competition operate through different markets. A natural thought seems to be that competition in the labor market may be good, but competition in the capital market may be bad, both in terms of performance. In other words, neoclassical and Schumpeterian economists may both be right, but rather than combining the opposing effects in some nonlinear relationship, we point to different factor markets. The potential policy conclusions would be vastly different. The aforementioned literature may suggest an optimal level of product market competition at best. We say at best, because competition is modeled as a shift in consumers' preferences (more substitutability) and firms are assumed to (Bertrand) price compete throughout. In this paper, however, departures from competition are modeled directly as rents and factor markets are targeted.
What do we mean by competition and performance? The measurement of performance is relatively straightforward. Solow (1957) has demonstrated for perfectly competitive economies that the shift of the production possibility frontier, which is the ultimate determinant of the standard of living, is measured by total factor productivity growth (TFP). TFP is also the relevant measure for the standard of living in non-or less competitive economies, where it measures not only the shift of the frontier, but also the change in efficiency (Nishimizu and Page, 1982) . In short, we let performance be measured by TFP.
The measurement of competition is trickier. The industrial organization literature provides a number of indices. Perhaps concentration indices are the most popular ones, but we will not employ them. We believe that industries with a low number of firms may well be competitive. In the tradition of Lerner (1934) we measure market power more directly by the extent that price has been raised over cost, i.e. by rent.
Indeed, Nickell (1996) finds that rent is the most important determinant in the assessment of the influence of competition on performance, but rent is hard to measure. Nickell takes the difference between the rates of return on company capital and treasury bonds and admits this merely measures capital rent, and even as such is only a rough proxy; neoclassical economists point out that competition stamps out labor rent.
In the spirit of Nickell we take rent as the (negative) measure of competition and define it by the difference between actual and perfectly competitive rewards. Actual rewards are given by value-added and perfectly competitive rewards by factor costs at shadow prices. To determine the latter we need a general equilibrium model, which may have been the main obstacle in assessing the role of competition in the performance of an economy. We do so by analyzing Canadian input-output data over the period 1962-1991. Rent and TFP are determined at a level of aggregation that is more macro-than micro-economic.
Section 2 presents the model we employ to determine competitive valuations. Then, in section 3, we define rent and impute it to capital and labor. Section 4 investigates the relationship between competition and performance (as measured by rent and TFP, respectively).
The productivity model
Both competition and performance are related to productivity. For performance the connection to productivity is straightforward, as it is measured by TFP, the growth of (total factor) productivity. The connection between competition and rent is slightly more indirect. Competition is (negatively) measured by rent. Rent is the difference between actual and perfectly competitive rewards, where the latter are essentially marginal productivities.
The standard approach to productivity is neoclassical TFP analysis, where output and input components are combined into indices using value shares as weights. The acceptance of value shares at face value is equivalent to taking factor rewards for granted and this procedure has been justified for perfectly competitive economies (Solow 1957 and Jorgenson and Griliches 1967) . We, however, are interested in the difference between observed and competitive rewards, and, therefore, cannot apply the standard procedure, but must derive productivities from the real input and output data of the economy.
We follow Nishimizu and Page (1982) in letting total factor productivity growth be the composition of a shift of the best-practice frontier (true technological progress) and a change in technical efficiency, and using linear programming techniques to identify the frontier and the resulting level of efficiency. Nishimizu and Page (1982) use sectoral panel data to estimate a time-shifting translog production frontier for every sector and sectoral levels of technical efficiency in each period, but ignore the input balance constraints. We estimate instead a general equilibrium model with different sectoral levels of activity in each period and an overall level of technical efficiency for the whole economy in each period.
Our model is input-output in spirit, but we admit different numbers of industries and In (1), the observed allocation corresponds to s = e and c = 1. This is feasible. The optimal value of expansion factor c will be greater than one. It measures the ratio of potential to actual domestic absorption. Domestic absorption is GDP except net exports; it is also called domestic GDP. We denote the shadow prices associated to the constraints of program (1) 
The first dual constraint equates value added to factor costs for active industries (which have zero slack according to the theory of linear programming), all at shadow prices. The second dual constraint normalizes the level of commodity prices by the multiplicative constant we entered in the objective function of (1). The third dual constraint aligns the prices of the tradable commodities with the terms of trade.
The primal (1) and dual (2) programs have equal value by the main theorem of linear programming. In view of the price normalization constraint of (2) the identity reads:
The level of total factor productivity is given by the ratio of actual output to optimally weighted factor input, . According to equation (3) the level of total factor productivity is 1/c, which is essentially Debreu's coefficient of resource
allocation (ten Raa, 2003) . Total factor productivity growth is the rate of growth of the level of total factor productivity at fixed price weights:
Total factor productivity growth has been shown to be the sum of the Solow residual,
and the efficiency change, 
with weights
The industry Solow residuals measure the dynamic performance of the economy. The static performance is measured by the efficiency change. The latter, see formula (8),
measures the growth rate of the actual/potential GDP ratio, because c measures the ratio of potential to actual domestic GDP. Here efficiency change is driven by reallocations of the factor inputs, capital and labor, between industries. It could be imputed to the industries following ten Raa (2003), but these efficiency changes would still measure inter-industry allocative gains rather than intra-industry catching up with best practices. Input-output analysis implicitly identifies technical coefficients with observed input-output proportions. Sectoral productivity growth rates, see (8), capture technical change, intra-firm efficiency changes and inter-firm allocative efficiency changes (ten Raa, 2005) . It would be interesting to make this further decomposition, but that requires access to and use of the establishment data underlying the use and make tables.
Rent
In a broad sense, rent comprises all payments made to factor inputs for the provision of their services. The owner of a building collects rent from the businesses that use denotes differentiation with respect to time.
the space and a worker receives compensation for the labor provided. This broad concept of rent includes not only the opportunity costs of the services but also the bonuses that reflect distortions such as market power. The narrow concept of rent, however, is limited to these bonuses and, therefore, consists of the excess payments over and above the opportunity cost. It is the latter concept of rent that we use to measure departures from competition.
The first dual constraint of (2) is the value relationship between value-added and factor costs when prices are competitive. It has its counterpart for observed prices, which we denote by p°, r°, and w° for commodities, capital, and labor, respectively, where the superscript indicates 'observed.' Thus,
Here σ° is defined residually and represents profits.
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We define Rent as the difference between observed value-added, given by row vector p°(V T -U) and competitive value-added, given by row vector . The row vector of differences defines rent by sector. We can impute rent (in each sector)
Given that the make matrix V is in producer prices and the use matrix U (and the final demand matrix F) is in consumer prices, there is a discrepancy due to various types of margins. The Canadian inputoutput tables contain a separate table of 7 types of margins. We have assimilated the margins to final demand, which is computed residually from the U, V and net trade (g) data. The margins are most likely included in our residual measure of observed capital rents, obtained by subtracting observed labor payments from observed value added.
to the factor suppliers. Subtracting the first dual equation in program (2) from equation (10) we obtain:
In words, rent is the sum of capitalists' rent, workers' rent, and excess profits. Often capitalists' rent and excess profits are pooled, to define K-rent, (r° -r)K + (σ° + σ).
Similarly denoting workers' rent (w° -w)L by L -rent, equation (11) is consolidated as follows:
Notice that each term in equation (12) is a row vector of industry rents. The consolidation of profits into capital rent is apt for economies where profits accrue to shareholders, rather than workers, i.e. capitalism. All the rent terms represent excess payments, over and above competitive values, so that rent is a negative measure for competitiveness. This is in the spirit of Nickell (1996) , who captures capital rent by putting r = treasury bills rates and σ = 0, and who misses labor rent. We fill the gaps by letting our general equilibrium model determine the shadow prices.
Although we are able to dissociate capital from labor rents, we admit that we face some aggregation problems. There are more than three types of capital: often software, hardware, telecommunication equipment and inventories are measured as separate pieces of the aggregate capital stock, and the separation of R&D from value added is presently under discussion in statistical offices. There is certainly more than one type of labor. Actually, data on labor by type of occupation exist for Canada, but not for the whole period that we are analyzing. 4 Therefore we have not separated out labor into different types. Given the different compositions by type of labor and capital across industries, our assumption of uniform competitive factor payments across sectors is certainly debatable.
Competition and performance
The standard approach to measuring the impact of competition on performance is to regress the Solow residual (representing performance) on rent (representing the departure from competition): , 45, t = 1963, ...,1991 (13) A positive role of competition would be signaled by a negative value of β. 3.28** 4.10** 3.60** 3.30** 4.38** 3.67** The dependent variable is the industry Solow residual; SSR is the sum of squared residuals; df is degrees of freedom; the F-test tests the joint significance of the dummy coefficients; ** indicates significance at the 5% level.
The interesting result is thus that rents in the hands of capital but not rents in the hands of labor yield higher TFP growth. The within estimates indicate the need to control for time-specific effects (although the test of pooling reveals no heterogeneity over time). Remember that the sectoral TFP growth figures are obtained jointly by the resolution of pairs of linear programs. By the general equilibrium property yearspecific shocks are transmitted to all sectors. Thus we have good reasons to believe that time effects are important indeed.
In table 2 we estimate a random effects specification of heterogeneity for the model with both types of factor rents. The sector and year error components have standard deviations that are significantly different from zero. According to the Hausman test, there is no correlation between the factor rents and the error terms, except when sector effects are not controlled for. We therefore prefer the random effects estimates, since under that hypothesis they are more efficient. Labor rent is never significant. Capital rent, however, boosts TFP growth. A billion dollar increase in capital rents (which corresponds on average to roughly 30% of the total capital rents per sector), increases sectoral TFP growth by 0.06%. The magnitude of the lack of competition effect is not tremendous, but the sign agrees with the Schumpeterian perspective. The conflict between neoclassical and Schumpeterian economists on the role of competition has never been resolved by the evidence. Our disaggregation of rent into capital and labor components throws some dim light on the issue. Both Schumpeter and the neoclassical economists may be right, but their mechanisms are channeled through different markets, namely the capital and labor markets, respectively. In hindsight this should not come as a surprise. Schumpeter's argument, that departures from competition may yield positive contributions to dynamic efficiency, was built on the role of R&D, particularly the way it is financed. The neoclassical argument, that competition is good, has been built on the insight that it eliminates slack, particularly managerial laziness. Upon closer inspection, the arguments point at different factor markets and may both apply. We obtain evidence in favor of a Schumpeterian effect that operates through the capital market, but no evidence of a neoclassical effect that would operate through the labor market. The Hausman test of exogeneity of rents is not very reliable as it is based on a non-positive definite difference in the variance-covariance matrices of the respective estimates.
In table 3 we double-check the hypothesis of a Schumpeterian effect from capital rent on productivity, knowing that there is a large consensus that R&D earns a positive rate of return and hence has a positive effect on TFP. We regress by ordinary least squares the pooled data of R&D stock on capital rent and labor rent, again lagged by one period. We present the estimates of both the fixed effects and the random effects models, with one and two sources of heterogeneity. The Hausman test is only accurate for the sector heterogeneity, where it accepts the exogeneity of the regressors with respect to the error terms. In any case, the fixed and random effects estimates tell the same story. When we control for the greatest source of heterogeneity (sectoral effects), the capital rent is positively correlated with the R&D expenditures, as hypothesized by Schumpeter, and not labor rents. When we control for time effects, surprisingly it is labor rent that is positively correlated with R&D expenditures, whereas capital rent is not significant. The deviations over time of R&D expenditures with respect to industry means is positively correlated with deviations in capital rents from industry means. The sectoral deviations with respect to yearly means across all sectors seem to be correlated with the same kind of deviations in labor rents. The story could still be consistent with a neoclassical view, in the sense that excess labor rent stimulates attempts to reduce cost through process R&D. (This interpretation would require additional verification. We do not at this stage have R&D split into process and product R&D.) If we control for both sources of heterogeneity, no factor rent is significant, although at the margin (if we accept a 12.5% level of confidence)
we would accept the Schumpeter hypothesis.
Conclusion
We have investigated the influence of competition on performance. Performance is measured by Solow residuals derived from a general equilibrium model that maximizes the standard of living. The factor rewards are shadow prices, which are not necessarily equal to the observed rewards. In fact, the difference is rent, which we take as the (negative) measure of competition.
The weak evidence we have found can be summarized as follows. Total rent exerts a positive influence on productivity performance and it is significant at the 7% level, even if we control for business cycle and technological opportunity effects by using time and sector dummies. Capital rents dominate the total effect. When capital and labor rents enter the equation separately, labor rents turn out insignificant, but capital rents continue to have a strong positive sign. Schumpeter and the neoclassical economists may both be right, but their mechanisms are channeled through different factor markets, namely the capital and labor markets, respectively. Indeed, the use of rent as a source of funding for R&D applies to capital and the argument that rent yields slack pertains to labor. The Schumpeter hypothesis is also backed by R&D regressions on capital rent. There are three capital types, namely buildings, equipment, and infrastructure. 5 The gross capital stock, hours worked and labor earnings are from the KLEMS database of Statistics Canada, described in Johnson (1997) . In particular, corrections have been made to include in labor the earnings of the self-employed, and to separate business and non-business labor and capital. The total labor force figures are taken from 5 Statistics Canada calls them ''building constructions,'' ''equipment'' and ''engineering constructions.'' Alternatively we could have modeled capital as being sector-specific, the so-called putty-clay model. We prefer the present hypothesis of mobility of each type of capital across sectors for three reasons. First, to let the economy expand, we would have needed capacity utilization rates, which are badly measured and unavailable for a number of service sectors. Second, to relieve a numerical collinearity problem, we would have to relieve the capital constraint on the non-business sector. Third, the Cansim (D767870) and converted in hours using the number of weekly hours worked in manufacturing (where it is the highest). Out of the 50 industries, neither labor nor capital stock data exist for sectors 39, 40, 48, 49, 50; The 169-commodity classification has been bridged to Statistics Canada's 94-commodity classification. As the debt constraint in (1) is given in Canadian dollars, we convert U.S. prices to Canadian equivalents. We have used, whenever available, unit value ratios, (UVRs, which are industry specific) computed and kindly provided to us by Gjalt de Jong (1996) . The UVRs are computed using Canadian quantities valued at U.S. prices. For the other commodities, we have used the purchasing power parities (PPP) computed by the OECD (which are based on final demand categories).
The UVRs establish international price linkages for 1987, the PPPs for 1990 in terms of Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar. We hence need two more transformations. First, U.S. dollars are converted to Canadian dollars using the exchange rates taken from combination of 11 non-tradable and sector-specific capacity expansion limits is too stringent. It would lead to a high shadow price on construction commodities and zero shadow prices almost anywhere else.
Cansim (series 0926/133400). Second, since the input-output data are in 1986 prices, we need the linkage for 1986, which is computed by using the respective countries' commodity deflators: the producer price index for the U.S. (see above) and the total commodity deflator from the make table (except for commodities 27, 93 and 94, for which we use the import deflator from the final demand table) The structure of some non-tradability constraints implies the equality of the activity levels of ''construction'' and final demand, ''owner-occupied dwellings'' and final demand, and ''printing and publishing'' and ''travel, advertising and promotion.'' We have forced the activity level of industry 39 (government royalties on natural resources, which essentially pertains to oil rigging in Alberta) to follow industry 5
(crude petroleum and natural gas) to ensure there are no such royalties without oil rigging. A more detailed documentation of the data and their construction is available from the authors upon request.
